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OLIVIER BLANCHARD AND MICHAEL KREMER
Under central planning, many ﬁrms relied on a single supplier for critical
inputs. Transition has led to decentralized bargaining between suppliers and buy-
ers. Under incomplete contracts or asymmetric information, bargaining may inef-
ﬁciently break down, and if chains of production link many specialized producers,
output will decline sharply. Mechanisms that mitigate these problems in the
West, such as reputation, can only play a limited role in transition. The empirical
evidence suggests that output has fallen farthest for the goods with the most com-
plex production process, and that disorganization has been more important in the
former Soviet Union than in Central Europe.
Figures I and II show the evolution of ofﬁcial measures of
GDP in the countries of the former Soviet Union since 1989. The
two ﬁgures give a striking picture, that of an extremely large de-
cline in output. In ten out of the ﬁfteen countries, GDP for 1996
is estimated to stand at less than half its 1989 level.1
The evolution of these ofﬁcial measures reﬂects in large part
a shift to unofﬁcial, unreported activities. But studies that at-
tempt to adjust for unofﬁcial activity still conclude that there has
been a large decline in output. For example, a recent study by
Kaufmann and Kaliberda [1995] puts the actual decline in GDP
from 1989 to 1994 for the set of countries of the former Soviet
Union at 35 percent.2
This large decline in output presents an obvious challenge
for neoclassical theory. Given the myriad price and trade distor-
tions present under the Soviet system, these countries surely op-
erated far inside their production frontier before transition. With
the removal of these distortions, one would have expected them
to operate closer to the frontier, and thus output to increase. And
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The Evolution of GDP in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and the Balticsone would have expected that the development of new activi-
ties would shift the production frontier out, leading to further
increases in output over time. This clearly is not what has
happened.
In this paper we explore one explanation for the decline of
output, which we believe has played an important role. The best
word to describe it is disorganization. Its logic goes as follows.
• Central planning was characterized by a complex set of
highly speciﬁc relations between ﬁrms. (Following standard
usage, we shall call a relation “speciﬁc” if there is a joint sur-
plus to the parties from dealing with each other rather than
taking their next best alternative.) There were typically
fewer ﬁrms in each industry than in the West.3 For many
inputs, ﬁrms had or knew of only one supplier from which to
buy. For many of their goods, ﬁrms had or knew of only one
buyer to whom to sell.4
• Speciﬁcity opens room for bargaining. Under asymmetric
information or incomplete contracts, the result of bargaining
may be inefﬁcient. If many parties are linked in a complex
set of speciﬁc relations, the output loss may be large.
• Through various institutions and arrangements, econo-
mies develop ways of limiting the adverse effects of
speciﬁcity.
Under central planning, the main instrument was the
coercive power of the central planner to enforce production
and delivery of goods.
In the West, for some goods, there are many alternative
buyers and sellers, eliminating speciﬁcity altogether. And for
the other goods the scope for adverse effects of speciﬁcity is
reduced by arrangements ranging from vertical integration,
to contracts, to long-term relations between ﬁrms.
• Transition eliminated the central planner, and thus the
main instrument used to limit the adverse effects of speciﬁc-
ity under the previous regime. But the mechanisms that ex-
ist in the West could not operate right away. New buyers and
sellers cannot be created overnight. The role of contracts is
reduced when many ﬁrms are close to bankruptcy. At the
3. One reason is that, in the West, (nonnatural) monopolies and associated
monopoly rents create incentives for entry of new ﬁrms. There was no such mech-
anism under central planning.
4. The buyer was often a centralized trade organization, which disappeared
altogether during transition.
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state ﬁrms will disappear or change suppliers, thus shorten-
ing horizons and reducing the scope for long-term relations
to avoid the adverse effects of speciﬁcity.
• The result has been the breakdown of many economic rela-
tions. Trade between the republics of the former Soviet
Union has fallen by far more than seems consistent with ef-
ﬁcient reallocation. Despite price liberalization many ﬁrms
report shortages of inputs and raw materials. Firms lose cru-
cial workers/managers, who may have been their only hope
for restructuring and survival. Cannibalization of machines
is widespread, even when it appears that machines could be
more productive in their original use. This general disorgani-
zation has played an important role in explaining the decline
in output.
Our paper is organized as follows.
• In Sections I to III we show through three examples how
speciﬁcity, together with either incompleteness of contracts
or asymmetric information, can lead to large output losses.
We show how the effects depend both on the degree of speci-
ﬁcity in the relations between ﬁrms, and on the complexity
of the production process. We also show how the emergence
of new private opportunities can lead to a collapse of produc-
tion in the state sector, and to a sharp reduction in total
output.
• In Section IV we argue that the mechanisms used in the
West to deal with speciﬁcity take time to develop and have
therefore played a limited role in transition.
• In Section V we provide evidence that, in line with our
theory, in the former Soviet Union, output has fallen farthest
in those sectors with the most complex production processes.
• In Section VI, taking measures of reported shortages of
inputs by ﬁrms as indicators of disorganization, we show
that disorganization appears to have played an important
role in the former Soviet Union, but a more limited one in
Central Europe.
• In the conclusion we compare our explanation of the de-
cline in output with several other explanations, and argue
that it helps to explain why output in China has increased,
rather than decreased, in transition. We also discuss policy
implications.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 1094Before starting, it is useful to do some product differentiation.
Our analysis is based on standard ideas in microeconomics,
from holdup problems under incomplete contracts, to problems of
bargaining under asymmetric information, to the breakdown of
cooperation in repeated games as the horizon shortens or as al-
ternative opportunities arise.5 The potential importance of speci-
ﬁcity for macroeconomics has been emphasized recently by
Caballero and Hammour [1996]. Our contribution is to point to
the potential importance of these problems in the context of
transition.
Our analysis complements other explanations of the decline
in output in transition. Most explanations start from the need for
state ﬁrms to decline and transform, and for new private ﬁrms to
emerge. Some argue that the output decline may reﬂect efﬁcient
reorganization and unmeasured investment in information capi-
tal, as ﬁrms try new techniques and workers look for the right
jobs [Atkeson and Kehoe 1995; Shimer 1995]. The others combine
reallocation with some remaining distortions, explaining the de-
cline in output as a second-best outcome. Perhaps the most
widely accepted explanation argues that efﬁcient reallocation
would have implied a decrease in real wages of some workers in-
consistent with either actual wage determination or political con-
cerns about income distribution; as a result of these constraints,
employment and output have decreased (see Blanchard [1997] for
further discussion). Three theories are related to ours. The ﬁrst,
developed by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny [1992], emphasizes
the potentially perverse effects of partial price liberalization. The
second, developed by Shleifer and Vishny [1993], focuses on the
role of corruption, and emphasizes the adverse effects of rent
extraction by government ofﬁcials. The third, developed by Li
[1996], focuses on the scope for decentralization to activate mo-
nopoly power and lead to a decrease in output. We shall point out
the relations as we go along.
Finally, our analysis is related to an older literature on the
role of complex networks of production in the pretransition Soviet
Union [Banerjee and Spagat 1991, 1992]. More recently, Ickes,
Ryterman, and Tenev [1996] have discussed the role of these net-
works in transition.
5. Wells and Maher [1995], for example, show how outcomes within a house-
hold may be worsened by improved outside opportunities for a member providing
“public goods” to the household.
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This section and the next two present examples of how mar-
ket imperfections that lead to inefﬁcient bargaining can cause
output to fall with transition. In the example of this section, bar-
gaining breaks down because contracts are incomplete.
The example goes as follows.
• A good is produced according to a Leontief technology and
requires n steps of production. Each step of production is car-
ried out by a different state ﬁrm. (A point of semantics. We
shall use “state” ﬁrms to denote the ﬁrms that existed under
central planning and produced under the plan, whether or
not they have been privatized since the beginning of transi-
tion. We shall use “private” ﬁrms to denote the ﬁrms that
have been created since transition.) One unit of the primary
good leads, after the n steps, to one unit of the ﬁnal good.
Intermediate goods have a value of zero, and the price of the
ﬁnal good is normalized to one.
One may replace “distribution” by “production” here: for an
interpretation with a Soviet ﬂavor, think of a good having to
travel through n republics, to go from the primary producer
to the ﬁnal distributor.
• The supplier of the primary good has an alternative use
for the input equal to c. One can think of c as a private oppor-
tunity, perhaps the production of a much simpler good,
avoiding the division of labor implicit in the chain of produc-
tion; c may therefore be much lower than 1. It is straightfor-
ward to introduce similar private opportunities for the
intermediate producers along the chain of production, but
the point is made more simply by ignoring that possibility.6
• Each buyer along the chain knows only the supplier it was
paired with under central planning, and vice versa. The end
of central planning thus leaves n bargaining problems. We
assume that there is Nash bargaining at each step of produc-
tion, with equal division of the surplus from the match.
We assume that it is possible to simultaneously exchange
goods and cash, but not to commit to deliver goods in the future.
6. An assumption that would make a difference is if outside opportunities
were always equal to or larger than c, and were increasing with the stage of pro-
cessing. As will be clear below, under our assumptions about bargaining, state
production would then always take place when it was efﬁcient for it to do so. In
other words, it is essential for our results to assume that a partly processed good
has a lower outside value than the initial input.
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with the buyer (the next ﬁrm in the chain) before it has produced
the good. Each ﬁrm must ﬁrst buy inputs and produce, and only
then—once the cost of producing is sunk—strike a bargain with
the next producer in the chain. This assumption makes sense in
the West in contexts in which each producer needs the input pro-
cessed in a speciﬁc way, which cannot be fully contracted on in
advance, as in Grossman and Hart [1986] and Hart and Moore
[1990]. The assumption is likely to be of broader relevance in the
former Soviet Union, where the legal system is still in construc-
tion, contract enforcement is weak, and ﬁrms often have few val-
uable assets, making it hard to punish them for deviating from
contracts.
The characterization of the solution is straightforward and
is obtained by working backward from the last stage of produc-
tion. The value of the surplus in the last bargaining problem, be-
tween the ﬁnal producer and the next-to-last intermediate
producer is equal to one (by assumption, the good is useless be-
fore the ﬁnal stage). Thus, the next-to-last intermediate producer
receives (1/2). Solving recursively, the ﬁrst intermediate producer
receives (1/2)n.
The surplus to be divided between the ﬁrst intermediate pro-
ducer and the supplier of the primary good is equal to (1/2)n 2 c.
If c , (1/2)n, the surplus is positive, and production takes place
along the chain. If instead c . (1/2)n, the primary producer pre-
fers to take up his private opportunity. Thus, the appearance of
even mediocre private opportunities will lead to the collapse of
production in the state sector (what matters here is not the abso-
lute level of private opportunities, but their level relative to op-
portunities in the state sector); in our example, the decrease in
total output may be as large as 1 2 (1/2)n. The more complex the
structure of production (the higher n), the smaller the private
opportunities needed to trigger the collapse of the state sector.
Note that the collapse of output is really due to the combina-
tion of two factors: the improvement in private opportunities, and
the loss of coercive power by the government. If, in the face of
improving private opportunities (an increase in c), the govern-
ment retained its coercive power, i.e., could still force suppliers to
deliver, it could achieve the efﬁcient outcome, and output would
not decline. To the extent that the last years of the Soviet Union
were associated with a steady decrease in the coercive power of
the central planner, this may explain why Soviet economic perfor-
DISORGANIZATION 1097mance deteriorated before the start of transition. And this also
implies that a transition in which the central planner retained
some power, and could thus limit the role of decentralized bar-
gaining, might be associated with a smaller decline in output. We
shall return to this theme both in our next example, and in our
discussion of China in the conclusion of the paper.
The source of the inefﬁciency and of the collapse of output
under decentralized bargaining in our example is a “holdup”
problem: each intermediate producer must produce its intermedi-
ate good before bargaining with the next producer along the
chain. Once he has produced the intermediate good and has no
alternative use for it, his reservation value is equal to zero. The
inefﬁciency would therefore disappear if all the producers could
sign an enforceable contract before production took place. In this
case, production would take place as long as c was less than 1.
The source of the problem is thus the combination of speciﬁcity,
which gives rise to the bargaining problems, and incomplete
contracts.
Even in the West, many goods are sufﬁciently speciﬁc that
ﬁrms can only get them from one supplier, or sell them to one
buyer. In Section IV we argue that vertical integration and long-
term relations between producers, which help alleviate this prob-
lem in Western economies, can play only a limited role in
transition.
II. ASTATE FIRM AND ITS SUPPLIERS: CASE I
In our second example the source of bargaining breakdown
is not incomplete contracts but asymmetric information.
• A state ﬁrm needs n inputs in order to produce. If all in-
puts are available, the ﬁrm can produce n units of output.
Otherwise, output is equal to zero.
• Each input is supplied by one supplier. Each supplier has
an alternative use for his input, with value c, distributed uni-
formly on [0,c]. Let F(?) denote the distribution function, so
that F(0) 5 0 and F(c) 5 1. Draws are independent across
suppliers.
We can again think of c as a private sector alternative,
such as small scale production or sale of the input to a foreign
buyer. The distribution of c is known, but the speciﬁc realiza-
tion of each c is private information to each supplier. c can be
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 1098thought of as indicating the degree of development of the pri-
vate sector, which we assume is very low pretransition, and
increasing over time thereafter.
• The state ﬁrm maximizes expected proﬁt. We assume that
it announces a take-it-or-leave-it price p to each supplier
(given the symmetry built in the assumptions, the price is
the same for all suppliers). If the price exceeds the reserva-
tion prices of all suppliers, production takes place in the state
ﬁrm. Otherwise, it does not, and all suppliers use their own
private opportunity.
We can now characterize expected state, private, and total
production as a function of c and n. We must ﬁrst solve for the
proﬁt-maximizing price set by the state ﬁrm. Given price p, ex-
pected proﬁt is given by
p   ( (1    =- Fp pn
n () ) ).
The ﬁrst term is the probability that production takes place.
The second is equal to proﬁt if production takes place. Maximiz-
ing with respect to p yields the proﬁt-maximizing price,
pc n n    min( /(  + 1)). = ,
The ﬁrm never pays more than the maximum alternative
opportunity c. But, if the maximum alternative opportunity ex-
ceeds (n/(n 1 1)), the ﬁrm does not increase its price. Increasing
the price would increase the probability that production takes
place, but would decrease expected proﬁt.
Given this price, expected state production Ys is equal to
Yn n
nc
s
n
     min 1,
 + 1
= æ
è
ö
ø
æ
è ç
ö
ø ÷
1 .
Expected private production Y p is equal to the probability
that state production does not take place, times the conditional
expected sum of alternative opportunities (conditional on at least
one private alternative being larger than the price offered by the
state ﬁrm). Y p can be written as7
7. The expression for Y p is derived as follows. Denote by V the event where
at least one private opportunity exceeds the price, so that production takes place
in the private sector. Y p is thus given by
Yc c f c f c d c d c
pn n n      + . . . +   . . .  , . . . ,  = ò() ( ) ( ) .
11 1 W
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Expected total production is in turn equal to
YYY sp      +  º .
The best way to see what these equations imply is to look at
Figure III, which plots the behavior, for n 5 4, of expected state,
private, and total production (all three normalized by the number
of inputs, n) for values of c ranging from 0.4 to 2.4.
To interpret the ﬁgure, it is useful to keep the efﬁcient bench-
mark in mind (which would be the outcome if the monopsonist
was fully informed about the alternative opportunities of each
supplier and thus was fully discriminating, or if there were mar-
kets for inputs that revealed these alternative opportunities). As
long as c was less than one, production would always take place
in the state sector. As c increased above 1, it would sometimes be
efﬁcient not to produce in the state sector: expected production in
the state sector would decrease, but total expected production
would increase. Eventually, as c became very large, most produc-
tion would take place in the private sector, with expected total
production increasing linearly with c.
In contrast with the efﬁcient outcome, increases in private
opportunities lead initially to such a large decrease in state pro-
duction that the net effect is a decrease in total production. Total
production starts declining when c exceeds (n/(n 1 1)) 5 0.8. For
c equal to 1, the efﬁcient outcome would be that production still
only takes place in the state ﬁrm, with total production equal to
n (1 in the ﬁgure, as output is divided by the number of inputs).
The actual outcome is a production level of only 0.75. It is not
Let Vc be the complement of V, the event where each private opportunity is less
than the price. Rewrite Y p as
Yc c f c f c d c d c
c cfc fc d c d c
p nn n
nn n c
    (  + . . . +   . . .  , . . . ,   
     + . . . +   . . .  , . . . , 
=
-
ò
ò
11 1
11 1
)() ()
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Solving the two integrals gives
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Rearranging gives the equation in the text.
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Behavior of Expected State, Private, and Total output; n 5 4
before c has reached a value of about 2.0 that total production is
again equal to its pretransition level.
Complexity of production in the state sector increases the
size of the decline in output. We can think of n as an index of the
complexity of the production process. Figure IV shows the effects
of alternative values of n on the evolution of expected total pro-
duction (again normalized by the number of inputs) as a function
of c. The larger n, the higher the price that the state ﬁrm offers:
for c large enough so that the minimum condition does not bind,
p 5 n/(n 1 1). Thus, the higher n, the higher the value of c re-
quired to trigger the collapse of the state sector. But, also the
higher n, the smaller the probability that production takes place
in the state ﬁrm for c $ p, and thus the greater the initial collapse
of total production as c increases. As n approaches inﬁnity, the
price offered by the state ﬁrm approaches 1, and state production
collapses as soon as c increases above 1: the probability that at
least one supplier will have a realization of c greater than 1 goes
DISORGANIZATION 1101FIGURE IV
Behavior of Expected Total Output for Different Values of n
to 1. Thus, as n approaches inﬁnity, the path of total production
(normalized by the number of inputs) approaches 1 for c , 1, and
c/2 (the expected value of private production) for c . 1. When c
increases above 1, output falls by 50 percent.
Putting our results in words: pretransition, suppliers have
such poor alternative opportunities that the state ﬁrm can offer
a price at which there is no better alternative than to supply. As
transition starts, and alternatives improve, some suppliers now
have more attractive opportunities. They start asking the ﬁrm
for more. Not knowing which suppliers are blufﬁng and which
are not, the ﬁrm offers a given price and takes the risk of not
getting the inputs. The result is an initial decrease in total pro-
duction as opportunities improve.
Let us take up ﬁve related issues at this point.
(1) We have restricted the state ﬁrm to make take-it-or-leave-
it offers to suppliers. One may ask what would happen if we con-
sidered more general mechanisms, in which suppliers sent mes-
sages about their outside opportunities, with both the decision of
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 1102whether to operate the state ﬁrm and the payments to suppliers
depending on these messages. The answer follows from the work
on multiagent bargaining under asymmetric information by Mai-
lath and Postlewaite [1990a, 1990b] and Rob [1989]. In the con-
text of our model, their results imply that, as the number of
suppliers gets large, the probability that the state ﬁrm will oper-
ate goes to zero—even when it is efﬁcient for the state ﬁrm to
produce. Intuitively, this is because, as the number of suppliers
gets large, the chance that a single supplier is pivotal in de-
termining whether the state ﬁrm will produce becomes small,
and hence the amount suppliers are paid cannot vary much with
their announced private opportunity. In this sense, the optimal
mechanism has similar properties to the take-it-or-leave-it mech-
anism we have assumed here.
(2) We have assumed that transition implied the disappear-
ance of the central planner, and that outcomes were fully deter-
mined by decentralized bargaining. One may ask what would
happen if, in the face of improved private opportunities, the gov-
ernment retained some coercive power.
Suppose that the government could still impose some punish-
ment to those suppliers who did not supply (say, by using trans-
fers, demotions, or even ﬁnes or jail sentences for those who did
not deliver to the state ﬁrm).
As long as c was less than 1, a sufﬁciently strong government
could, just as in our ﬁrst example, achieve the efﬁcient outcome:
by using a sufﬁciently large punishment, it could make sure that
all suppliers delivered to the state ﬁrm—the efﬁcient outcome
when c is less than 1. If c was greater than 1, the government
(which, by assumption, does not know the values of private oppor-
tunities) could not achieve the efﬁcient outcome, but could still
increase expected total output by using some positive level of
punishment. To see this, take the case where c is only slightly
greater than 1; we saw earlier that, in that case, absent the cen-
tral planner, state production would almost surely collapse when
n got large, leading to a large decrease in total output. In that
case, it is clear that a small punishment will be sufﬁcient for sup-
pliers to supply and for state production to always take place, an
outcome which is nearly always efﬁcient, and leads to an increase
in expected output. Thus, the collapse of output in our second
example can be seen as the combination of improved private
opportunities and a decrease in the coercive power of the
government.
DISORGANIZATION 1103We can reinterpret this result in the light of the work on
multiagent bargaining under asymmetric information referred to
earlier. D’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet [1979] have shown that,
in such games, a social planner who can impose negative utility
on players can achieve a fully efﬁcient outcome through a revela-
tion mechanism. This result relies crucially on the absence of a
participation constraint—the social planner must have the power
to extract sufﬁcient payments from the agents in order to provide
them with the incentives to behave efﬁciently. In the Soviet
Union participation constraints became binding with the end of
central planning and privatization.
(3) We have assumed that the sellers had private informa-
tion, and that the buyer set the price. But the roles could be re-
versed. What is essential for our results is that there be private
information, and that the uninformed party have some bar-
gaining power.
Suppose, for example, that the state ﬁrm has private infor-
mation about the value of ﬁnal production, but that, now, suppli-
ers make price offers to the ﬁrm. Assume that they have no
private opportunities, and choose the price so as to maximize
their expected revenue. If the sum of the prices charged by suppli-
ers is higher than the actual value of ﬁnal production, production
does not take place. It is straightforward to show that in this case
the probability that suppliers collectively ask for too much and
that ﬁnal production does not take place is positive. It is also easy
to show that this probability increases in the number of suppli-
ers: the more complex the production process, the more likely is
state production to collapse.8 To relate this result to the previous
point, note that what triggers the collapse of output here is the
emergence of decentralized bargaining, not the appearance of pri-
vate opportunities.
This result is also closely related to results on the adverse
effects of corruption on output. We have assumed that the price
setters were suppliers. But they may be government ofﬁcials sell-
ing permits to operate the ﬁrm. There is therefore a close parallel
between our argument that decentralized bargaining between
ﬁrms has led to a decline in output, and the argument made by
8. More formally, assume that if all inputs are supplied, output is equal to
n«, with « distributed, for example, uniformly on [0,1]. Now consider the problem
facing supplier i. Denote the sum of the prices set by all other suppliers as p2i.
Supplier i maximizes (1 2 (p2i 1 pi)/n)pi, and thus chooses a price equal to pi 5
(n 2 (p2i)/2. In the symmetric equilibrium pi 5 (n 2 1)pi, so that the common price
is equal to p 5 n/(n 1 1), and the state ﬁrm produces with probability 1/(n 1 1).
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 1104Shleifer and Vishny [1993] that political decentralization has led
to competition among rent extractors, with large adverse effects
on output.9
(4) Our example is closely related to the analysis by Murphy,
Shleifer, and Vishny [1992] of the effects of partial price liberal-
ization. In their model, the fact that some prices are held ﬁxed
while others are left free can also lead to an inefﬁcient diversion
of output from state to private ﬁrms (Young [1996] argues that a
similar perverse mechanism is relevant in China, and has led to
too much replication of activities across provinces). Our argu-
ment is that the same perverse effects can occur even under full
price liberalization. The fact that shortages were particularly
high in Russia in the early transition (see Section V) indeed sug-
gests the relevance of partial price liberalization. But the fact
that, years after nearly complete price liberalization, ﬁrms still
report shortages (again see Section V) suggests that more is at
work than partial price liberalization. The implications of the two
models for policy are potentially quite different. The Murphy-
Shleifer-Vishny model implies the desirability of full price liberal-
ization, while our model supports the idea that full price liberal-
ization may lead to reductions in output and welfare, at least in
the short run.
(5) Our example overstates the adverse effects of private sec-
tor growth. Private sector growth has at least two dimensions.
We have focused on the ﬁrst, the improvement in private opportu-
nities for existing suppliers. We have shown that such an im-
provement may lead to a decrease in state and in total output.
The second is the creation of new suppliers and is likely to work
the other way: the increase in the number of suppliers is likely
to decrease speciﬁcity, alleviate bargaining problems, and thus
increase both state and total output. To the extent that entry of
new suppliers takes time, the ﬁrst dimension seems likely to
dominate early in transition; the second, however, may dominate
later on.
III. ASTATE FIRM AND ITS SUPPLIERS: CASE II
The third example shows how speciﬁcity and complexity can
combine to create coordination failures, and a collapse of output.
In this model, technology is again Leontief in n inputs. Be-
9. Empirical evidence on the number and the size of bribes needed to run a
business in the Ukraine today is given by Kaufmann and Kaliberda [1995].
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suppliers as the n crucial workers in the ﬁrm. But this is not
essential. The essential difference between this and the previous
model is in the timing of decisions. In the previous model, if state
production did not take place, suppliers could still take up their
private opportunity. Here, suppliers have to decide whether or
not to take their private opportunity before they know whether
production is taking place in the state ﬁrm. This difference in
timing introduces problems of coordination between workers,
which we now examine.
The model is as follows.
• Astate ﬁrm needs n workers in order to produce efﬁciently.
Assume that its technology is Leontief in those workers (who
are therefore the workers who are difﬁcult to replace; we can
think of the other workers as having been solved out of the
production function).
If all workers stay, the ﬁrm produces n units of output,
equivalently one unit of output per worker. If one or more
workers leave, the ﬁrm can hire replacements; replacements,
however, are less productive. If the ﬁrm has to hire one or
more replacements, output per worker is equal to g,1.
Thus, n measures the complexity of the production pro-
cess. The parameter g (which was implicitly put equal to 0 in
the ﬁrst example) is an inverse measure of the speciﬁcity of
existing workers.
• Each worker has an alternative opportunity given by c,
distributed uniformly on [0,c]. Draws are independent across
workers. The distribution of c is known, but the speciﬁc real-
ization of each c is private information. We can think of c as
representing the opportunities open to the most qualiﬁed
workers after transition, from opening their own business, to
working for foreign consulting ﬁrms, and so on.10
• The wage paid is equal for all workers (this follows from
the assumption that alternative opportunities are private in-
formation, and the symmetry in production), and is equal to
output per worker. This assumption simpliﬁes the analysis
and is reasonable in the case of many state ﬁrms (where
there is, de facto, no outside residual claimant), but the
10. An alternative interpretation of this model is as a model of shirking,
where workers have different costs of effort. If all workers put in effort, output
per worker is one. If some do not, output per worker is equal to g instead. Under
that interpretation, one may interpret the model as applying to all workers.
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creased with other workers’ participation.
• Workers must decide whether to take up their private op-
portunity before they know the decisions of other workers,
and thus the level of output and the wage per worker in the
state ﬁrm. We assume that they are risk neutral, so that
their decision is based on the expected wage.
Thus, if all workers decide to stay, output per worker,
and therefore the wage, is equal to one. If one or more work-
ers take up their private alternative, some replacement
workers must be hired, and output per worker and the wage
are equal to g.
It is clear that the solution to the problem facing each worker
has the following form: stay if c is less than some threshold c*;
otherwise leave. To characterize c*, think of the decision problem
facing one worker. If he leaves and takes up his alternative oppor-
tunity, he will receive c. Suppose that he decides instead to stay.
Given that, by symmetry, the (n 2 1) other workers also have a
threshold equal to c*, the probability that they all stay is given
by (F(c*))n21. Expected output per worker, and thus the wage he
can expect to receive if he stays, is therefore equal to (F(c*))n21 1
g(1 2 (F(c*))n21). The threshold level c* is such that he is indiffer-
ent between leaving or staying, so that
(1)      + min(1,( / (1    ). cc c
n ** ) ) =-
- gg
1
Expected output per worker, and thus the expected wage, are
given in turn by11
(2)      + min(1, )(1    ) . wc c
n =- gg (* /)
The solution to equation (1) can be one of three types, depending
on the value of c. These three cases are represented in Figure V
which plots both sides of equation (1) on the vertical axis against
c* on the horizontal axis. The ﬁgure is drawn assuming values of
n 5 5, and g50.2. The left-hand side of the equation is repre-
sented by a 45-degree line. The right-hand side is represented by
a curve that is initially convex, turning ﬂat and equal to 1 for
c* $ c.
11. Note the different exponents in equations (1) and (2), (n 2 1) versus n.
Each worker knows his own alternative opportunity when choosing whether to
stay or not, and thus the uncertainty comes from what the n 2 1 other workers
will do. The expected wage is the unconditional expectation of the wage and de-
pends on what all n workers do. The difference between c* and w goes to zero as
n is large.
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Equilibrium c* for Alternative Values of c
• For low alternative opportunities there is only one equilib-
rium, in which all initial workers decide to stay, leading to a
level of output per worker equal to one. In Figure V the only
equilibrium corresponding to the case where c 5 0.3 is at
point A.
• For intermediate alternative opportunities there are two
equilibria (the equilibrium in-between is unstable using
standard arguments), one in which all workers stay and out-
put per worker is 1, and one in which most workers are likely
to leave, where c*, and in turn expected output per worker,
are close to g. In Figure V, for c equal to 0.7, the two equilib-
ria are at points A and B.A tA ,c *i s1 .A tB ,c * (and the
expected wage from equation (2)) is very close to 0.2: the
probability that at least one worker will leave is very high.
• For higher alternative opportunities—for c . 1—there is
a unique, low activity, equilibrium.
In Figure V, for c 5 1.1, the only equilibrium is at point
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 1108B, where c*, and the expected wage, are both equal to a value
close to 0.2: production in the state sector is very unlikely.
We want to emphasize two separate aspects of these results.
(1) The ﬁrst is the existence, over some range, of multiple
equilibria. Some ﬁrms may disappear simply because they are
expected to, either by their suppliers or their essential workers.
This occurs not because of private information, but because work-
ers cannot commit beforehand. To see this, note that even when
workers have an alternative opportunity equal to a known and
common value c, then, for values of c between g and c, there are
still two equilibria, one in which all workers stay in the state ﬁrm
(the efﬁcient outcome), and one in which all workers take up their
alternative opportunity.12
Is one equilibrium more likely to prevail? The arguments
here are standard. On the one hand, the equilibrium with high
production is Pareto superior. The game is one of pure coordina-
tion, so if the workers can talk beforehand, one could argue that
they should be able to coordinate on the equilibrium which is bet-
ter for all of them. On the other hand, if each worker believes that
there is some probability that some other worker will irrationally
refuse to participate, then the high equilibrium can unravel. As
n becomes large, even a small probability that one worker will
irrationally refuse to participate can lead to the rational collapse
of output.
(2) The second aspect derives from the combination between
private information and interactions between decisions given the
timing of decisions. It is the rapid collapse of state output as soon
as there is a positive probability that at least one private alterna-
tive exceeds the wage under efﬁcient production in the state ﬁrm.
For example, for the case where c 5 1.1 in Figure V (so that the
expected value of private opportunities is only equal to 0.55, com-
pared with 1 in the state ﬁrm if workers stay), the probability
that all initial workers stay in the state ﬁrm is nearly equal to 0,
and expected production per worker in the state ﬁrm is very close
to 0.2, a highly inefﬁcient outcome.
To see why output collapses, note that as soon as c is greater
than 1, there is a chance that a worker will leave. The wage that
remaining workers can expect to receive is thus reduced in pro-
12. The structure of this special case is identical to the model in Bryant
[1983].
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turn, this reduction in the expected wage prompts more workers
to leave, and so on. The effect of higher values of n is to magnify
the interactions between the workers’ decisions. For example, for
c 5 1.01, expected output per worker in the state ﬁrm is equal to
0.92 if n 5 2, but falls to 0.21 when n 5 3.13
This aspect of the model appears to capture a number of as-
pects of transition. It captures the idea that crucial managers
may leave a ﬁrm, despite potentially large payoffs from turning
it around, because they are not sure that others will stay around
long enough. If we return to an interpretation of the model with
suppliers rather than workers, the model is consistent with anec-
dotal evidence from Russia that suppliers are often very reluctant
to supply state ﬁrms, because of the difﬁculties of getting paid. If
they are not paid on delivery but only if the ﬁrm succeeds in pro-
ducing and selling its production, then, just like workers in our
example, suppliers become residual claimants. (This raises the
issue of why state ﬁrms do not pay their suppliers on delivery.
More on this in the next section.) The probability that one of them
will not supply leads all of them to be leery of supplying, leading
to collapse of the state ﬁrm.
IV. MANAGING SPECIFICITY
We have presented three examples of how decentralization
of decision-making under transition can lead to a breakdown in
bargaining and, if there are many participants in the bargaining,
to large decreases in output. But these examples raise a general
issue. If anything, the production structure in the West is even
more complex than it is in the East. Why are problems arising
from speciﬁcity not as severe in the West?
We have already hinted at some of the answers.
(1) In the West many goods are traded in thick markets, mar-
kets with many buyers and many sellers. And while for many
intermediate goods, ﬁrms deal with only one supplier, there are
likely to be other potential suppliers; shifting suppliers may be
difﬁcult but not impossible.
13. To see the role of timing decisions, these results can be compared with
those that obtain when workers decide whether or not to take their private oppor-
tunity after having observed the decisions of others. In that case, the probability
that all workers stay in the state ﬁrm is equal to (1/c)n, and expected output per
worker in the ﬁrm is equal to g1(1/c)n(1 2g ). For c 5 1.01, expected output per
worker in the state ﬁrm is equal to .98 if n 5 2, and .97 if n 5 3.
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such as retail trade, transition has not led to a collapse of output.
For many goods, however, thick markets cannot be created over-
night. There are just not enough suppliers or buyers in the econ-
omy to start with; and it takes time to create new ﬁrms. Opening
the economy to foreign trade increases the potential number of
buyers and sellers, and that can clearly help. Indeed, one of the
arguments for imposing convertibility and low tariffs in Poland
in 1990 was to limit the monopoly power of domestic ﬁrms
by increasing competition, an argument closely related to ours
[Sachs 1993].
(2) The very nature of (any) transition is such that there is
limited scope for long-term relations in solving problems arising
from speciﬁcity.
In stable economic regimes, such as under central planning
in the Soviet Union in the past, or in Western market economies
today, long-term relations can play an important role in reducing
inefﬁciencies arising from speciﬁcity. To see this, take for example
our third model, and assume that workers who decide to take up
a private opportunity cannot work for the state ﬁrm in the future
(one can again replace “workers” by “suppliers” in what follows).
This may be either for technological reasons (they have to move
to another city) or because it is the optimal punishment from the
point of view of the state ﬁrm. Then, if individual private opportu-
nities are partly transitory, workers will think twice about leav-
ing. More formally, they will use a much higher threshold, a
higher value of c*, for deciding whether to take up a private op-
portunity. The result will be a higher probability that workers
stay, and higher expected production overall.
In that context, the value of c* will depend crucially on the
probability that the ﬁrm still exists and relies on the same work-
ers in the future. If this probability is low, then workers will be-
have opportunistically, in a way close to that characterized in the
previous section. But by the nature of transition, this probability
is indeed likely to be low: transition implies that many state ﬁrms
will disappear, and that, even if they survive, they will have to
change operations as well as many of their suppliers.
In a neoclassical benchmark, if it took time for new, more
productive ﬁrms to arise following transition, state ﬁrms would
continue producing until they were replaced by the new ﬁrms.
The argument we have just developed suggests that the mere an-
ticipation that more efﬁcient private ﬁrms will eventually appear
DISORGANIZATION 1111can lead to a decline in production in state ﬁrms. It may also
explain why the preofﬁcial transition period in the Soviet Union
was characterized by increasing disorganization and decreasing
output, as the shortening of horizons led to more opportunistic
behavior on the part of ﬁrms. There is indeed some evidence that
the degree to which state ﬁrms felt they had to satisfy the plan
decreased in the Soviet Union with the increased likelihood of
reform in the mid-1980s.14
(3) Most state ﬁrms in transition are short on “cash” (more
precisely, have limited liquid assets, and limited access to credit).
The potential role of cash in reducing problems coming from
speciﬁcity is clearest in our third example. Consider the case
where there are two equilibria, one in which existing workers
stay and productivity is high, and one in which they leave, forcing
the ﬁrm to hire less efﬁcient replacements. A commitment by the
ﬁrm to pay each existing worker a wage of one, independently of
what the other workers do, will lead all workers to stay, and will
sustain the efﬁcient equilibrium, at no cost to the ﬁrm.
Thus, ﬁrms with “deep pockets” can alleviate some of the
problems arising from speciﬁcity.15 But state ﬁrms in the former
Soviet Union typically do not have such deep pockets: ﬁrms have
limited access to credit, and many are close to bankruptcy. Under
these conditions, they have no easy way of convincing their work-
ers to stay or their suppliers to supply. This argument points to
the role of foreign direct investment: foreign ﬁrms typically have
deep pockets. They can pay suppliers on delivery; they can credi-
bly promise to pay their workers even if things go wrong. They
can therefore avoid the problems of coordination faced by most
domestic ﬁrms.
(4) There is more scope in the West for contracts to handle
problems created by speciﬁcity.
The potential role of contracts in solving or alleviating prob-
lems of speciﬁcity is clearest in our ﬁrst example. In that model,
if producers can sign binding contracts before production takes
place, then they will avoid holdup problems, and achieve an efﬁ-
14. Fear of shortening horizons can also explain why industry opposes laws
requiring ﬁrms to provide workers advance notiﬁcation of plant shutdowns and
why some ﬁrms choose to pay severance pay rather than provide their workers
with notice of layoffs. Ellickson [1989] notes that at the time of the collapse of the
nineteenth century whaling industry, the norms of cooperation that had evolved
among whalers began to break down.
15. See Holmstrom [1982] for a related point.
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tunities improve.
There is little question, however, that the scope for contracts
to alleviate holdup problems is more limited in the East. The de-
ﬁciencies of the current Russian legal system have been pointed
out by many (for example, Greif and Kandel [1994]). Contract
enforcement is weak (in our ﬁrst example, once a ﬁrm has pro-
duced, the buyer of its output has an incentive to renege and offer
a lower price). Contract enforcement is therefore crucial. Firms
have few assets that can be seized, and thus less to lose from
breaking a contract. This last aspect takes us to the next point.
(5) While state ﬁrms were often more vertically integrated
than in the West, the type of vertical integration needed to allevi-
ate problems of speciﬁcity during transition is different from
what it was in the past.
The reason to vertically integrate under central planning
was the imperfect ability of the central planner to enforce timely
delivery of some inputs, leading ﬁrms to protect themselves
against such disruptions. Sachs [1993] gives the example of an
industrial ﬁrm installing pigpens to raise pigs and insure the de-
livery of food to their workers in the face of food shortages.
After decisions are decentralized, vertical integration is most
needed for those inputs with a high degree of speciﬁcity, and thus
a large potential for serious bargaining problems. Pigpens are
not necessary anymore: markets in agricultural goods have elimi-
nated the problem. But the problem may now be that a friend in
the Ministry who used to be able to ensure that a speciﬁc engine
part was delivered by the sole supplier is no longer in a position
to guarantee delivery.
Thus, the initial structure of vertical integration can play
only a limited role in transition. And creating new vertically inte-
grated structures of production both has sharp limits and takes
time. The arguments here are standard. First, chains of produc-
tion interlock. When suppliers have more than one buyer, which
supplier integrates with the buyer? Second, if vertical integration
is to be achieved through the purchase of existing ﬁrms, the bar-
gaining problems we saw become relevant, this time not in the
determination of input prices, but now in the determination of
the purchase price of ﬁrms. If n 2 1 of the ﬁrms in our ﬁrst ex-
ample vertically integrate, the remaining ﬁrm has an incentive
to hold out for a large part of the rents, and thus a high purchase
DISORGANIZATION 1113price. Thus, no ﬁrm will want to be the ﬁrst to be vertically inte-
grated. This suggests much of vertical integration needs to pro-
ceed through the development of new activities within the ﬁrm.
This, like the development of new ﬁrms, takes time.
V. EVIDENCE ON OUTPUT DECLINE ACROSS SECTORS
One implication that appears speciﬁc to our explanation of
the output decline during transition is that the decline should
have been more pronounced for goods with more complex produc-
tion processes. We have explored this implication and report the
results in this section. In short, we ﬁnd that output has indeed
fallen more for more complex goods.
We proceeded as follows.
We gathered data on the output of 159 goods for nine coun-
tries (Moldova, FYR Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Belarus,
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Albania, and Russia) from 1992 to 1994
(1991 to 1994 for Russia), and constructed output growth for each
country/good. Our choice of countries was determined by data
availability, and our prior belief that disorganization might have
played an important role. Our choice of dates was determined by
data availability, and by the fact that in all of these countries,
the bulk of price liberalization was implemented in 1992. We are
indebted to the IMF for providing us with those data; these come
in turn from the National Authorities and IMF staff estimates.
We do not have data on output for all goods for all countries: the
number of country/good observations is only 310.
We then used the 1990 “100-sector” input-output table for
Russia in current producer prices to construct an index of com-
plexity for each good.16 We ﬁrst allocated each of the goods to its
corresponding sector (so that the goods which belong to the same
sector have the same index of complexity).17 We then deﬁned the
index of complexity for sector i, call it ci as
cii j
j
   1    º- å () , f
2
where fij is the share of input j in the production of i.
16. We are indebted to Esther Duﬂo for providing us with the table, which is
based on unpublished Goskomstat information.
17. We excluded one good, fruits and berries, because it is listed in the input-
output matrix under “other goods,” a residual sector that also includes movies, for
example, and is too heterogeneous for our purposes (the results do not depend on
that exclusion).
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concentration for sector i. By construction, complexity is equal to
zero if there is only one input, and complexity tends to one if the
sector uses many inputs in equal proportions. The Appendix
shows the resulting complexity index for the different sectors.18
Most but not all the rankings make sense. For example, medical
equipment is among the most complex sectors, and cotton produc-
tion among the least. However, some of the numbers are less
plausible: for example, logging is more complex than railway
equipment. We did not try to second guess our mechanical rule.
We constructed three additional variables to control for some
of the other factors which may have contributed to the decline in
output. The ﬁrst variable, Durability, is a dummy that is equal to
one if the good is durable, zero otherwise. The production of dur-
able goods typically falls relative to the production of nondurable
goods during recessions in the West. The next two variables,
which we took from the work of Duﬂo and Senik-Leygonie [1997]
on Russia, try to capture the degree to which the sectors were
subsidized directly and indirectly pretransition, and the degree
to which these subsidies have been phased out. The Price ratio is
the ratio of 1990 world-to-domestic prices for each sector. The
Cost growth variable is the growth rate of the factor cost index
for each sector, namely the sum of the growth rates of each factor
price from 1990 to 1992 multiplied by the share of that factor in
production in 1990.19 Table I shows summary statistics for output
growth, complexity, and these additional variables.
We then regressed output growth on a set of country dum-
mies, the index of complexity, and various combinations of the
other three variables. The results are reported in Table II. Col-
umn 1 reports the results of a regression that includes only the
index of complexity (and the country dummies). The index is
highly signiﬁcant. The results of including the additional vari-
ables are reported in columns 2 to 8. Durability and complexity
are highly correlated; thus, not surprisingly, introducing the du-
rability variable leads to a decrease in the estimated effect of
complexity; the effect, however, remains signiﬁcant. The price ra-
tio variable is typically insigniﬁcant; the cost growth typically
highly signiﬁcant. But neither variable has much of an effect on
18. “M&E” in the Appendix stands for machinery and equipment.
19. Note that these two variables are constructed using data from Russia,
and therefore may be less accurate for other regions, in particular the two coun-
tries outside the former Soviet Union: Macedonia and Albania.
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OUTPUT GROWTH, COMPLEXITY, AND OTHER VARIABLES:S UMMARY STATISTICS
Variable Observations Mean S.D.
Output growth 308 246.2 34.4
Complexity 308 0.72 0.16
Durability 308 0.21 0.41
Price ratio 308 0.77 0.67
Cost growth 308 1.28 0.50
Sources. see text.
the coefﬁcient on the complexity variable. We examined whether
our results were driven by outliers; they do not appear to be. To
summarize the results of the table, looking across columns, a one-
standard deviation increase in complexity leads to a fall in output
of roughly 3 percent when durability is included, of 5 to 8 percent
when it is not.
The complexity measure we use is surely a very noisy mea-
sure of n, the theoretical variable of interest. Our earlier ex-
amples imply that the fall in output is determined by the number
of inputs for which there is speciﬁcity in the relationship between
buyer and seller, rather than by the total number of sectors from
which inputs are purchased. The complexity index will therefore
tend to underestimate true complexity for goods that require sev-
eral different specialized inputs from within a single sector, and
overestimate it for goods that require competitively supplied in-
puts from many different sectors. Further noise is introduced be-
cause our data on complexity are for sectors, but the goods for
which we have output data may be more or less complex than the
sector as a whole. To the extent that our measure of complex-
ity is subject to classical measurement error, the coefﬁcient on
complexity is biased downwards. However, there may be other
sources of measurement error that lead to an upward bias. In
particular, the coefﬁcient on complexity may be picking up some
of the effects of durability, since the durability measure we use in
estimation is discrete, and therefore measures durability with
error.
VI. EVIDENCE ON SHORTAGES ACROSS TIME AND COUNTRIES
In this section we attempt to assess the relative importance
of disorganization, both over time and across countries in transi-
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.tion. To do so, we rely on measures of reported shortages of raw
materials and intermediate products by ﬁrms. Two remarks are
in order at the start.
What ﬁrms exactly mean when they report “shortages” is ad-
mittedly unclear.And it is also not clear whether the breakdowns
in supply that occur in our three examples should be called short-
ages. It is plausible that ﬁrms facing breakdowns in supply as in
our examples would report them as shortages. It is also possible
that ﬁrms experiencing sharp changes in supply and thus in
market-clearing input prices—as is likely to be the case in transi-
tion—may report those as shortages. There are, however, no
measures of “breakdowns in supply,” while there are measures
of reported shortages. We are reasonably conﬁdent that reported
shortages are a decent proxy for disorganization, and are thus
worth looking at.
We focus on shortages because most alternative theories of
the output decline do not naturally predict shortages.20 One ex-
ception is the theory developed by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny
[1992] based on partial price liberalization: shortages may reﬂect
the effects of partial price liberalization. In most republics, how-
ever, most prices have now been liberalized, so that partial price
liberalization probably plays a limited role in explaining short-
ages at this point.21Another is the theory developed by Berkowitz
[1996], who argues that, if local authorities keep control of some
prices, they may prefer to set low prices and use rationing; we
have not explored how to distinguish empirically between this
and our explanation.
We read the available evidence as suggesting that disorgani-
zation has played a limited role in the major Central European
countries, some role in Russia and the Baltics, and a major role
in the other republics.
(1) Since 1992–1993 the OECD has carried out a survey of
ﬁrms in manufacturing in a number of Central European and
20. Phenomena such as wage compression in state ﬁrms compared with pri-
vate ﬁrms (for example, Rutkowski [1996] for Poland and Ko ¨llo ˆ [1996] for Hun-
gary), the collapse of interrepublican trade, cannibalization of machines,
“spontaneous privatization,” and the carving up of ﬁrms are also consistent with
our story. The problem is that they are also consistent with other explanations.
The volume of trade may well have been too high. Cannibalization of machines or
of ﬁrms may be associated with efﬁcient reorganization, and so on.
21. For a survey of progress on price liberalization as of 1995, see European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development [1996].
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PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS EXPERIENCING SHORTAGES OF MATERIALS
min max 1996-1
Country percent percent value
Czech Republic 93-1–96-1 3 9 5
Hungary 92-1–96-1 6 11 5
Poland 93-3–96-1 3 6 5
Bulgaria 93-1–96-1 15 33 25
Romania 92-1–96-1 8 39 15
Latvia 93-1–96-1 21 32 21
Lithuania 93-3–96-1 13 43 17
Source. CCET [1996b], business survey annex, quarterly data. “min” and “max”: minimum and maxi-
mum percentage of ﬁrms experiencing shortages of materials during the period.
Baltic countries.Among other things, the surveys ask ﬁrms about
factors limiting production in manufacturing. The strength of
these data is that they come from roughly identical surveys. Un-
fortunately, they do not cover the early period of transition, when
disorganization is likely to have been relatively more important.
The evidence from these surveys is summarized in Table III.22
In the three major Central European countries, shortages of
materials have played a very limited role since 1992–1993. The
numbers are comparable to those obtained from similar surveys
of ﬁrms in Western Europe. Numbers from Berg and Blanchard
[1994] show that, even in 1990 in Poland (the ﬁrst year of transi-
tion), disruptions were not an important part of the story. The
proportion of ﬁrms citing “supply and employment shortages” as
a limiting factor in production was 62 percent in October 1989,
37 percent in January 1990 (the month of the “big bang”), but
down to only 10 percent by April 1990.
The evidence from those Central European countries that are
doing less well suggests a larger role for disorganization. In Bul-
garia and Romania, two of the countries with the largest drop in
output, supply shortages played an important role more than two
22. The list of answers from which ﬁrms can choose varies slightly from coun-
try to country.A typical list (in this case for Bulgaria) includes: “None, Insufﬁcient
demand, Weather conditions, Cost of Materials, Financial problems, Shortage of
skilled labour, Lack of appropriate equipment, Shortage of raw materials, Compe-
tition in own sector.” Firms can answer yes or no to each. The number reported
in the table is the proportion of ﬁrms saying yes. For more detail about the ques-
tions and the composition of the ﬁrms in the surveys, see CCET [1996a, pp.
43–54].
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PROPORTION OF FIRMS IN INDUSTRY MENTIONING THE FOLLOWING CONSTRAINTS AS
LIMITS TO PRODUCTION:R USSIA, 1991–1995
Shortages of
Insufﬁcient Shortages of ﬁnancial Shortages of
demand materials resources labor
1991 4 82 18 28
1992 51 46 45 8
1993 41 23 62 6
1994 48 19 64 5
1995 47 22 64 8
Source. Russian Economic Barometer, various issues.
years after the beginning of transition. The same is true of the
Baltic states.23
(2) Table IV gives corresponding numbers for Russia, since
1991 (from a sample of about 500 industrial ﬁrms, with a re-
sponse rate of 30–40 percent over time).
The most striking number is the proportion of ﬁrms experi-
encing shortages of materials in 1991. However, this is the last
year before full price liberalization (which took place in January
1992).24 Nonetheless, the numbers remained high in 1992, and
are still high by standards of market economies.
Another piece of evidence, which speaks more directly to dis-
organization, is the proportion of work time in ﬁrms lost to full
stoppages of production, by reason. The time series for Russia for
the years 1992 to 1995 are given in Table V.
“Lack of materials” is a close second to “Lack of Demand” in
explaining work stoppages during the period 1992–1995.
(3) Shortages of materials appear to play still a more impor-
tant role in the republics of the former Soviet Union. Table VI
gives some numbers for the Kirgiz Republic. The numbers are
from a survey of ﬁrms by Windell,Anker, and Sziraczki [1995] for
the ILO and are for 1993, thus a year after price liberalization in
the Kirgiz Republic, and one year after the collapse of trade be-
tween the Kirgiz Republic and the other republics of the former
23. Admittedly, part of this relation may reﬂect reverse causality from output
to shortages. A large output decline, for whatever reason, together with inefﬁcient
bankruptcies, can lead to the inefﬁcient shutting down of more ﬁrms, and thus to
more shortages.
24. It would be interesting to ﬁnd out how the proportion of ﬁrms experienc-
ing shortages evolved pre-1991. The survey used above starts in 1991. We have
searched for earlier surveys, but without success.
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PERCENTAGE OF WORKING HOURS LOST DUE TO FULL STOPPAGE OF PRODUCTION,
AND REASONS FOR IT:R USSIA, 1992–1995
By reason
Percentage Lack of Lack of
of hours lost demand materials Other
1992 10 59 40 1
1993 10 50 39 11
1994 18 53 35 13
1995 7 37 53 10
Source. Goskomstat Rossii, various issues. 1992 is August only. 1993 is the average over four quarters.
1994 is the average of May and October. 1995 is the average of the ﬁrst two quarters.
TABLE VI
MAIN BUSINESS PROBLEMS OF FIRMS IN INDUSTRY.K IRGIZ REPUBLIC, 1993
Shortages of Low Other
materials demand factors
Food processing 57 13 30
Textiles 36 17 47
Nonmetallic minerals 26 32 42
Fabricated metals 31 22 47
Wood and paper 63 16 21
Other 43 21 36
Source. Windell et al. [1995]. Proportion of ﬁrms, in percent.
Soviet Union. (However, 1993 is a period of very high inﬂation—
23 percent a month on average—High inﬂation is typically asso-
ciated with disruptions in trade, and this may account for some
of the shortages reported by ﬁrms.)
These numbers are in sharp contrast to those for, say, Poland
or Hungary. Shortages of materials seem to being playing a cen-
tral role. Further evidence suggests that they reﬂect mainly in-
ternal disorganization, rather than the collapse of trade between
republics: the same survey gives for each industry the proportion
of materials coming from domestic and nondomestic sources. Sur-
prisingly—given the collapse of trade with the rest of the FSU—
the correlation across sectors between the proportion of ﬁrms cit-
ing shortages and the share of materials coming from nondomes-
tic sources is roughly equal to zero.
Can one explain the differences between Central Europe and
the former Soviet Union? Our discussion suggests a number of
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higher in many of the republics of the Soviet Union than in, say,
Poland or the Czech Republic, leading to a larger collapse of both
intra- and interrepublican trade. Distance from the West, and
thus the volume of trade, and the scope for foreign ﬁrms to allevi-
ate problems of speciﬁcity, may also have played an important
role. These, however, are speculations at this point.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Transition was conceptualized in a recent World Bank World
Development Report [1996] as a movement “From Plan to Mar-
ket.” If our argument is right, then a more accurate, if less suc-
cinct, title would have been “From Plan and Plan Institutions to
Market and Market Institutions.” Transition may cause the ex-
isting organization of production to collapse, leading to a large
decline in output until new institutions can be created. Empirical
evidence on output decline across goods suggests that transition
has caused a breakdown of complex chains of production. Evi-
dence on shortages suggests that disorganization has played a
limited role in Central Europe, a more important one in the Bal-
tics and Russia, and an even more important one in the other
republics.
The fact that output has risen during transition in China is
difﬁcult to reconcile with many of the explanations for output col-
lapse in Eastern Europe. For example, there is no obvious reason
why efﬁcient reallocation should have led to an increase in output
in one case and a decline in the other. Our theory, however, sug-
gests several reasons why China may have been less susceptible
to breakdowns in bargaining, and disorganization. China’s lower
level of industrial development, and Mao’s explicit policy of
decentralizing industry to many small factories, implied that
complexity and speciﬁcity were less in the ﬁrst place [Wong 1985;
Qian, Roland, and Xu 1996]. The maintenance of political control
by the Chinese government and the continued role of quotas for
delivery of materials to state factories implies that centralized
allocation has not been fully replaced by decentralized bar-
gaining. And China’s commitment to maintain state ﬁrms, using
subsidies if necessary, may have lengthened horizons, allowing
for a larger role of long-term relations between state ﬁrms and
their suppliers, thus avoiding the collapse of state ﬁrms in the
face of new private opportunities.
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isting production networks provides a justiﬁcation for gradual-
ism. Suppose that in a neoclassical benchmark (i.e., absent the
effects we have focused on so far), and absent subsidies, many
state ﬁrms can be expected to disappear over time. The argument
we have developed implies that, once the implications of speciﬁc-
ity are taken into account, this may well lead to the immediate
collapse of those ﬁrms. Shorter horizons may lead suppliers to
behave more opportunistically, leading to the collapse of state
production. By the same argument, a commitment by the govern-
ment to subsidize state ﬁrms for some time may avoid their im-
mediate collapse.25
However, subsidizing state ﬁrms would be counterproductive
either if private ﬁrms were expected to develop rapidly or if they
were expected to take a very long time to emerge. If efﬁcient pri-
vate ﬁrms (ﬁrms with values of c equal to or greater than produc-
tivity in the state ﬁrms) are expected to develop quickly, then the
cost of maintaining state ﬁrms for a long time is not worth the
short-run beneﬁts. If it takes a long time for private ﬁrms to
reach the stage where the presence of private opportunities leads
to the collapse of state ﬁrms, there is no need for subsidies either,
at least for some time. In-between these two extremes, however,
if c is expected to be high enough to create problems of bar-
gaining, but low enough that state production is more efﬁcient
than private production for some time, the model suggests the
desirability of committing to subsidize state ﬁrms for some time,
in order to avoid their immediate collapse in the face of positive,
but mediocre, private opportunities.
Thus, the model provides a—limited—theoretical case for
gradualism. We believe, however, that factors outside the model
still militate strongly against subsidizing state ﬁrms. Subsidies
reduce the incentives of state ﬁrms to adjust. Subsidies have to
be ﬁnanced, and through the tax channel, slow the growth of new
private ﬁrms. And in the end, political economy considerations
may well still lead to the conclusion that the only way to stop
25. Think of subsidies by the government as affecting the probability that
the state ﬁrm will be alive at any point in the future. A high enough probability
will lead suppliers to increase the threshold at which they take up their private
opportunities. Technically, the commitment of the government must be such that
there is a positive probability, however small, that the state ﬁrm survives forever.
The argument is standard: if it were known that a ﬁrm was going to disappear
with certainty at some future point in time, things would unravel, and the ﬁrm
would collapse at the beginning.
DISORGANIZATION 1123subsidies is to stop them at once. Finally, while it may be possible
for a future reformist Cuba or North Korea to preserve some pro-
duction networks, it would probably now be impossible to restore
the old networks of production in most of the former Soviet
Union. Once Humpty-Dumpty has fallen down, all the King’s
horses and all the King’s men cannot put him back together
again.
APPENDIX: COMPLEXITY BY SECTOR
Sector Complexity Sector Complexity
Construction ceramics 0.94
Medical equipment 0.94
Other products 0.93
Glass & porcelain 0.93
Pharmaceuticals 0.92
Printing M&E 0.92
Wall materials 0.92
Household appliances 0.92
Medical products 0.92
Fire-resistant mater. 0.92
Linoleum products 0.92
Trade & dining M&E 0.91
Microbiology 0.91
M&E repair 0.90
Light industry M&E 0.90
Cement 0.90
Processed food M&E 0.89
Furniture 0.89
Metal products 0.89
Other chem. products 0.88
Confections 0.88
Logging 0.88
Other textile prod. 0.88
Rubber & asbestos 0.88
Casting M&E 0.88
Transportation 0.88
Construction M&E 0.87
Peat 0.87
Pumps & chem. equip. 0.87
Nonferrous ores 0.87
Communal M&E 0.87
Tractors & agri. M&E 0.87
Paints & lacquers 0.87
Mineral chemistry 0.86
Basic chemicals 0.86
Autos & parts 0.86
Machine tools 0.86
Shipbuilding 0.86
Electrotechnical M&E 0.86
Prefab concrete 0.85
Rooﬁng & insulation 0.85
Mining M&E 0.85
Plastic products 0.85
Hoisting technology 0.85
Railway equipment 0.84
Leather 0.84
Chemical ﬁbers 0.84
Tools and dies 0.84
Sanitary engineering 0.84
Organic chemicals 0.84
Energy & power equip. 0.83
Synthetic paints 0.83
Synthetic diamonds 0.83
Combustible shales 0.82
Other constr. materials 0.82
Bearings 0.82
Paper & pulp 0.82
Synthetic resins 0.82
Forging/pressing M&E 0.82
Precision instruments 0.81
Perfume oils 0.81
Radio electronics 0.81
Gas & gas products 0.80
Other food 0.79
Power 0.79
Oil products 0.78
Ferrous metals 0.78
Sewn goods 0.77
Vegetable oils 0.75
Wines 0.74
Tires 0.74
Plywood 0.73
Asbestos products 0.73
Synthetic rubber 0.73
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